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THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED LIABILITY
PROTECTION IN THE CORPORATE FORM:
THE AFTERMATH OF KIOBEL V. ROYAL

DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
Corporate alien tort was always a foundling doctrine. It came into the
world as the presumed child of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision in Kadic v. Karadzic in 1995, but its birth was never confirmed by
a definitive appellate review. Now, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, the 2nd
Circuit has declared the doctrine dead. The human rights lawyers who had
adopted it are in a state of mourning.1
INTRODUCTION
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Exxon Mobil Corporation, and BP p.l.c. were
each listed in the top five of Fortune Magazine’s world’s biggest companies
of 2010 in terms of revenue, but they share something in common beyond
their rivalry in the oil industry and their multibillion dollar profits.2 Each
enterprise has faced recent lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs under the
Alien Tort Statute3 (ATS).4 The ATS has traditionally provided a
mechanism for aliens5 to bring claims against individuals and corporations
for tortious conduct committed abroad.6 The statute expressly grants subject
matter jurisdiction to United States district courts7 and provides the

1. Michael Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12,
2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202473215797
[hereinafter Goldhaber, Life and Death].
2. Global 500, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/
full_list/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (determining 2010 corporate profits: $12,518 million (Royal
Dutch); $19,280 million (Exxon Mobil); $16,578 million (BP)).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away: An Assessment of Corporate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 379, 380
(2007) (citing Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets International Law: What’s the
Sequel to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 77 (2004) (stating that the
ATS is also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act by commentators who believe that the statute
incorporates causes of action)).
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (naming BP as defendant); Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 84 (9th ed. 2009) (defining alien as “a person who was born
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, who is subject to some foreign government, and who
has not been naturalized under U.S. law”).
6. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 161 n.12 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009)) (holding that alleged non-consensual medical experimentation by a
corporate defendant stated a claim under the ATS). But see id. at 120 (majority opinion) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ATS against corporations); Romero v. Drummond
Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he text of the Alien Tort Statute
provides no express exception for corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that [the ATS]
grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants”).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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opportunity for victims to be awarded “domestic remedies.”8 Enacted as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was initially ignored by
attorneys and was infrequently utilized for over 170 years.9 It was not until
the early 1980s, after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,10 that courts saw a rise in
ATS litigation. Starting in 1997, the ATS became a tool for human rights
groups to bring claims against domestic and international “corporations for
‘aiding and abetting’ human rights violations by foreign governments.”11
While mining and energy industries have been targets for ATS
litigation, approximately 150 ATS complaints have been brought against
various businesses and industries.12 While few ATS claims against
corporate defendants go to trial,13 approximately seventeen disputes have
been settled before trial for amounts as high as $5.25 billion.14 As such,

8. Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61,
61 (2008).
9. Sean Wajert, Second Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Alien Tort Statute Claim Against
Corporate Defendants, MASSTORTDEFENSE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.masstortdefense.com/
2010/09/articles/second-circuit-upholds-dismissal-of-alien-tort-statute-claim-against-corporatedefendants/.
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. John B. Bellinger III, Shortening the Long Arm of the Law, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 9,
2010, at 8.
12. Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1 (reporting on claims brought under the ATS
against clothing retailers for sweatshop allegations and Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co.
for their roles in supporting apartheid in South Africa).
13. Some disagreement exists regarding the number of corporate liability ATS cases that have
gone to trial. Compare Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether
Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31
MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 400–01 (2010) (stating that only two ATS cases have gone to trial,
including Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008), and Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008)), with Judith Chomsky, Will the Real ATS Please
Stand Up?, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 461, 465–66 (2010) (finding only three corporate
ATS cases have gone to trial: Jama v. U.S.I.N.S., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D. N.J. 2004), Estate of
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003) and Bowoto, 557 F. Supp.
2d. 1080), and Marc J. Gottridge & Matthew J. Galvin, The Alien Tort Statute: An Introduction
and Current Topics, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 2010, at 112–13 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac.
Course Handbook Ser. No. 25100) (2010) (determining that three ATS cases against corporations
have gone to trial: Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d. 1080, and
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).
14. Some of these settlements include:
Holocaust agreements ($5.25 billion from German state and industry, $1.25 billion
from Swiss banks and $210 million from Austrian state and industry); . . . $30 million
from Unocal for Burmese pipeline allegations; . . . $20 million from U.S. clothing
retailers for Saipan sweatshop allegations; and $15.5 million . . . [for] Shell’s activity in
the Niger delta.
Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1. See also Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 13, at 113–14
(listing other settlements involving corporate defendants in ATS cases).

2011]

The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection

575

liability under the ATS can have significant financial consequences
regardless of whether the lawsuit proceeds to the trial stage.15
For thirteen years, courts preserved the possibility of holding corporate
defendants liable under the ATS.16 However, on September 17, 2010, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the theory of corporate ATS
liability.17 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit held
that corporate liability is not a universally recognized norm of international
law and therefore claims against corporate defendants are beyond the scope
of the ATS’ jurisdictional purview.18
This note will argue that corporate liability should be preserved under
the ATS despite the Kiobel holding. Part I will examine the language of the
statute, distinguishing what the text directly states from what it does not
address. The influence of relevant legislative history will also be discussed.
Part II will explore how various courts have interpreted the ATS when
evaluating corporate liability and these courts’ holdings. Part III will
examine the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kiobel, including the concurring
opinion of Judge Leval. Part IV will discuss how the Kiobel majority’s
holding and reasoning are flawed, and will offer predictions regarding the
case’s potential impact on corporate liability claims.
I. THE STATUTE’S LANGUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Alien Tort Statute allows courts in the United States to hear cases
involving human rights violations19 that have been committed abroad and to
provide “domestic remedies.”20 Characterized as a unique jurisdictional
statute,21 §1350 contains three requirements in order to establish federal
subject matter jurisdiction: “(1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed
‘in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’”22

15. See Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Note, Procedural Dismissals Under the Alien Tort Statute, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 800–03, 808–09 (2010) (stating how high discovery costs and settlement
agreements contribute to costs under the ATS).
16. Id. at 804–15 (arguing that cases dealing with corporate ATS liability have been dismissed
on procedural grounds, particularly forum non conveniens, political question, comity, and
heightened pleading standard, thus leading to a gap in definitive adjudication of substantive issues
under the ATS). See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 153–54 (2d Cir.
2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding that international law
provides no basis for corporate liability yet dismissing the complaint as it did not meet the
pleading requirements).
17. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (rejecting corporate liability under the ATS).
18. Id.
19. See Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1 (finding that human rights lawyers have
adopted the ATS in order to fight allegations of human rights abuses abroad).
20. Keitner, supra note 8, at 61.
21. Judge Cabranes begins the majority opinion in Kiobel by noting the ATS is “a
jurisdictional provision unlike any other in American law and of a kind apparently unknown to
any other legal system in the world.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115.
22. Vega, supra note 13, at 417 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
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A. REQUIRED STATUTORY ELEMENTS
Under the first criterion, the statute makes clear who can initiate a
lawsuit—“an alien.” However, the statute does not specify the identity of a
defendant and does not even require that the defendant be a United States
citizen.23 The statute similarly does not exclude corporations as potential
defendants.24
The second element states that torts, generally, fall within the ATS.
However, the statute has been interpreted as a jurisdictional statute that does
not create causes of action. Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the
common law is the source of causes of action for international law
violations.25 As a result, no guidance is provided by the statutory language
to differentiate between civil and criminal conduct.26 Instead, courts have
been left with the necessary role of considering which claims are included
within ATS liability, and they have approached this task with caution.27
Originally,28 three specific offenses were held to be appropriate causes of
action: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”29 Arguably, if Congress had wanted to restrict
the application of the ATS to particular defendants or to criminal rather than
civil offenses, qualifying language could have been provided.30 However,
Congress failed to incorporate such structural limitations.
The last requirement under §1350—that the committed tortious act be
“in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”—does
not indicate what source defines the “law of nations.” Instead, courts have
held that “norm[s] of customary international law”31 that are “specific,
universal, and obligatory,”32 provide the appropriate foundation for
determining offenses that fit within the statutory framework. The inevitable
difficulty with this standard is that, “the absence of an international lawmaker and an international court with compulsory universal jurisdiction
entails that many rules are not clear, particularly when they are of
23. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction & Legal History in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV) [hereinafter Brief of
Professors]; JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 10 (2003).
24. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 3.
25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
26. Brief of Professors, supra note 23.
27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–29.
28. Originally in this framework corresponds to cases from 1789 until 1980.
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 68 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) (1769)).
30. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 7 (“Congress knew how to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts with regards to conduct and the identity of defendants.”).
31. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
32. Id. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
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customary origin, and are thus open to differing interpretations.”33
Therefore, there has been a “need for courts gradually to spell out the
contents of those rules.”34 Courts might consider offenses that violate the
terms of a treaty which the U.S. has signed and executed as the basis for
such actions. However, while seemingly more concrete than norms of
international law, most treaties do not inherently provide for private rights
or cover the range of offenses contemplated by the ATS.35 Only after
Congress enacts legislation that corresponds to offenses in such treaties
might courts gain jurisdiction to enforce private rights under it.36
B. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The text of the ATS reads, “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”37
Considering the statute is only one sentence long, legislative history is
necessary and helpful in illuminating the meaning of the text.
Unfortunately, little if any record of congressional debate38 regarding
private actions or private remedies under the ATS is available.39 As a result,
legal commentators and scholars have proposed a number of rationales to
explain why Congress chose to adopt the ATS.40
The ATS was established by the First Congress at a time when both the
federal and state governments were beginning to consider their roles and the
role of the judiciary in foreign affairs.41 The Judiciary Act of 1789 was a
direct result of these debates. It created a court system in accordance with
Article III of the Constitution.42 As a young nation, it was particularly
important for the United States to provide a consistent means of redress to
aliens so as to maintain good relationships with foreign governments.43
When the Judiciary Act was enacted, “the First Congress thought it crucial
to provide a federal forum to discharge the duty of the nation, to avoid
33. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 278 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (quoting Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 585, 590 (2004)).
34. Id.
35. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 15.
36. Id. (describing treaties as “non-self-executing” bases for establishing jurisdiction).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
38. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that the “Alien Tort Claims Act” is a misnomer
because it “impl[ies] that Congress passed the measure as a separate act, in which case one would
expect to find legislative documents from which Congress’ intent might readily be divined. . . .
[and this] is not the case”).
39. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004); Tim Kline, Note, A Door Ajar or a
Floodgate?: Corporate Liability After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 KY. L.J. 691, 692 (2005–
2006).
40. See ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2; Brief of Professors, supra note 23.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. III, IV; ELSEA, supra note 23, at 2.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
43. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 9.
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potentially hostile state courts, and to promote uniform interpretation when
dealing with violations of the law of nations.”44
Some have hypothesized that the United States, seeking to gain global
respect, recognized a need to create a remedial system to address tortious
misconduct that has not only harmed individual victims but jeopardized the
United States’ relationship with foreign nations.45 Since few torts were
initially considered to be of international significance,46 some theorists have
concluded that the ATS was designed to focus on the protection of
diplomats and foreign ambassadors, exclusively.47 Supporters of this view
highlight two historical episodes in which ambassadors were attacked in the
United States and after which Congress sought to reaffirm foreign
diplomatic protection through the ATS.48 Yet, since Congress sought
criminal action in those cases—rather than civil damages as provided for
under the ATS—this theory has been met with opposition.49
Seeking either criminal or civil liability nevertheless demonstrates an
interest in safeguarding foreign relations.50 Congress likely recognized that
such relationships would be most vulnerable during wartime and may have
drafted the ATS to cover “law of prize” cases—which include the capture
and ownership of seized vessels and cargo during wartime—with this
reality in mind.51 Beyond the war context, commentators have further
suggested that the ATS offers courts, regardless of location, universal
jurisdiction over egregious violations of international law, particularly those
that are considered hostis humani generis.52
II. COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS
In 2004, the Supreme Court considered ATS liability for the first and
only time.53 Rather than provide a clear standard for subsequent district and
circuit courts to follow, the Court left a number of questions unanswered.54

44. Brief of Professors, supra note 23.
45. Kline, supra note 39, at 693.
46. See discussion supra Part I.A.

47. ELSEA, supra note 23, at 8–9.
48. Id. (discussing the “Marbois Affair” in which the French Consul General was attacked in
Philadelphia and the arrest of a servant at the Dutch ambassador’s home in New York which violated diplomatic immunity standards).
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 10 (suggesting the existence under the ATS of universal jurisdiction over conduct
that is against all mankind including slave trading and piracy). Elsea defined hostis humani
generis as “enemies of all humanity.” Id.
53. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
54. Richard M. Buxbaum & David D. Caron, The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the
Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 511, 512–13 (2010) (discussing how Sosa has created
new questions regarding ATS liability). See also Kline, supra note 39, at 699–701.
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As a result, courts are split in how they approach ATS liability.55
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain involved the capture, torture, and subsequent
murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who was on
assignment in Mexico.56 DEA officials in the United States believed that
Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican doctor, facilitated the interrogation
process by prolonging the agent’s life in order to extend the torture efforts.57
After a warrant was issued, the DEA hired Mexican nationals to transport
Alvarez to the United States for trial.58 Alvarez was later acquitted and
returned to Mexico where he filed suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)59 and against Sosa, a Mexican national
who had assisted in Alvarez’s involuntary transportation to the United
States, for a violation of the law of nations under the ATS.60
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter,
interpreted the ATS to include a combination of “expansive and restrictive
terms.”61 The Court held that the ATS provided federal jurisdiction to hear a
limited number of claims that are “defined by the law of nations and
recognized at common law.”62 More precisely, the court limited the
jurisdictional scope to claims that “rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”63 As a
result, Alvarez’s “single illegal detention of less than a day, . . . transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment” did not violate
such a norm.64
While Sosa provided some guidance on the proper application of the
ATS, it did not establish a standard specific for corporate liability.65 There
is, however, a brief acknowledgment of the potential for corporate liability

55. Linda A. Willett et al., The Alien Tort Statute and Its Implications for Multinational
Corporations, BRIEFLY…PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., & LITIG., Sept. 2003, at 1, 16.
56. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 697–98.
59. Id. at 698. The government’s motion to dismiss the FTCA claim was granted and upheld
by the Court holding “that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims based on any
injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.” Id.
at 712.
60. Id. at 698.
61. Brief of Professors, supra note 23, at 7 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718).
62. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
63. Id. at 725.
64. Id. at 738.
65. Defendants included: Sosa, Mexican citizen; Garate-Bustamante, DEA operative; five
unnamed Mexican civilians; the United States; four DEA agents. Id. at 698. Therefore, no
allegations were brought against corporations. Alvarez filed suit under the ATS, Torture Victim
Protection Act and the FTCA. Id. at 698.
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in footnote 20 of the majority’s opinion.66 Lower courts have been forced to
wrestle with this footnote’s scope.67
B. LOWER COURT CASES WITH CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
The Supreme Court’s failure to determine whether or not corporations
could be held liable under the ATS has led to mixed results in courts that
have addressed this issue.68 Some cases suggest that directors and officers
of corporations, for example, can be deemed direct perpetrators of
international human rights violations and be held individually liable under
the ATS.69 In order for corporations themselves to be liable, courts would
be required to recognize some form of entity-based liability within the
jurisdictional framework of ATS, including respondeat superior or aiding
and abetting.70
1. Second Circuit: Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.
The Second Circuit analyzed whether aiding and abetting could
establish liability under the ATS in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank
Ltd.71 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants (fifty named corporations and
hundreds of unidentified corporations) collaborated with the South African
government to maintain its apartheid system.72 Since the issue of corporate
ATS liability was not raised by defendants, the court did not base its
decision on that issue.73 Still, the establishment of aiding and abetting

66. Id. at 732 n.20 (“A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual.”).
67. Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability Under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH ST. L. REV. 1065, 1078.
68. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM.
J. COMP. L. 455, 466 (2010).
69. E.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 (2d. Cir. 2010). See also
Ben Kerschberg, Corporate Executives: Get Ready for a Billion Dollar Lawsuit,
HUFFINGTONPOST (Dec. 2, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/benkerschberg/corporate-executives-get-_b_791292.html (suggesting that directors and officers will
become targets of ATS litigation).
70. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007)
(recognizing application of aiding and abetting in the ATS context); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d
232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding jurisdiction could be extended beyond state actors to private
actors under the ATS); Chomsky, supra note 13, at 462–63 (suggesting that corporate liability
under the ATS required the establishment of vicarious liability); Vega, supra note 13, at 388–89
(even though ATS litigation has focused on human rights violations, it has been suggested that the
ATS may provide a mechanism for alien plaintiffs to litigate claims of bribery); Kline, supra note
39, at 696 (describing claims brought against corporations based on “vicarious liability, direct
liability, and aiding and abetting”).
71. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
72. Id. at 258.
73. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282–83) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring)).
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liability arguably provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to bring claims
against corporate entities for their directors’ and officers’ conduct.
The district court initially held “that aiding and abetting violations of
customary international law cannot provide a basis for [ATS]
jurisdiction.”74 The district court, therefore, dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.75 The district court based its holding, in
part, on a “Statement of Interest” from the U.S. Department of State which
suggested that aiding and abetting liability under the ATS would
“potentially [have] serious adverse consequences for significant interests of
the United States.”76 This decision was subsequently vacated by the Second
Circuit, which held that aiding and abetting could constitute a form of
liability under the ATS.77 However, as demonstrated by Judges Katzmann,
Hall, and Korman’s separate opinions, the panel was unable to agree on the
required standard. “‘The upshot of this split [in Khulumani] is that
notwithstanding the agreement of two judges, Judge Katzmann’s view [of
aiding and abetting liability] did not constitute a holding and is therefore
not binding precedent . . .[and] the issue remains live.’”78
Judge Katzmann argued that the district court over emphasized
prudential concerns, including foreign policy considerations.79 Katzmann
canvassed various sources of international law to determine whether, as
required by Sosa, the requisite “universal recognition” of aiding and
abetting liability existed in the international community. From the London
Charter . . . to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . . .
[and] Rwanda (ICTR) . . . [he] noted that aiding and abetting has been
repeatedly recognized as an accepted form of liability.80

Categorizing the South African government as the principal and
Barclay National Bank Ltd. as the agent, the Rome Statute was viewed as
particularly instructive in determining a standard for aiding and abetting.81
Katzmann concluded that in order to establish aiding and abetting liability,
a defendant needed to: “(1) provide[] practical assistance to the principal

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
Id. at 259 (denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint).
Id.
Id. at 260.
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 100, 120 (John R. Crook ed., 2010) (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009)). See also Michael Garvey, Comment, Corporate
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative Prerogative, 29 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 381, 384–85 (2009) (discussing the absence of an established standard for
aiding and abetting liability).
79. Garvey, supra note 78, at 389–90 (discussing Katzmann’s evaluation of the district court’s
treatment of aiding and abetting liability).
80. Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
81. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (Katzmann, J., concurring).

582

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does
so with the purpose[82] of facilitating the commission of that crime.”83
Judge Korman, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also analyzed
the existence of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS and the
appropriate standard to employ when determining this form of liability.84
While agreeing with Katzmann’s purpose standard, Korman favored greater
deference to the United States and international governments who opposed
expanding ATS liability than did Katzmann.85 In addition, Korman
distinguished corporate and individual defendants, arguing that aiding and
abetting liability did not apply to corporate entities.86
2. Second Circuit: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman

Energy, Inc.
The Second Circuit’s standard for aiding and abetting in Khulumani
was affirmed in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.87
Here, the Second Circuit held that substantial assistance, with the purpose
of aiding in the unlawful conduct, was required to establish ATS liability.88
Talisman Energy involved allegations that Talisman aided and abetted,
or conspired with the Sudan government, in committing human rights
abuses.89 At this time, Talisman had purchased Arakis Energy Corporation,
the owner of oil development rights in Sudan and a member of an energy
company consortium.90 When considering the purchase, Talisman was
assured by Sudanese officials of the region’s “safety, security, and peace”
even though Arakis’ head of security and Freedom Quest International each
advised Talisman not to invest.91
The energy company consortium subsequently built all-weather roads
and upgraded airstrips to enhance business operations.92 Regardless of
Talisman’s efforts to limit their use, the new infrastructure was used by the
Sudanese government for military activities.93 In addition, the government
82. On the other hand, Judge Hall felt knowledge was sufficient with respect to intent. Id. at
288–89 (Hall, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id. at 330 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 155, 185 (John R. Crook ed., 2008).
86. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 321 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(rejecting Judge Katzmann’s assertion that there is “no distinction between a corporation and an
individual” because “the specific issue of corporate liability under customary international law”
was not litigated in any prior ATS cases and thus is not precedential).
87. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir.
2009).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 247.
90. Id. at 248–49.
91. Id. at 249.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 250.
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allegedly created buffer zones around the oil facilities, forcefully removing
civilians from the area.94
Plaintiffs alleged that Talisman aided and abetted, or conspired95 in, the
killing of civilians.96 While the Second Circuit previously addressed the
standard for ATS aiding and abetting liability against international banks
and corporations in Khulumani,97 its reasoning in that case was
nonbinding.98 Given this context, the Second Circuit held that purpose,
rather than knowledge, was required to make out an action for aiding and
abetting99—as well as for conspiratorial—liability.100
However, the Second Circuit failed to consider whether corporate
liability could exist for violations of customary international law, stating
“[b]ecause we hold that plaintiffs’ claims fail on other grounds, we need not
reach, in this action, the question of ‘whether international law extends the
scope of liability’ to corporations.”101 While the Supreme Court recently
had the opportunity to define corporate ATS liability, they declined to
review Talisman Energy.102
3. Eleventh Circuit: Romero v. Drummond Company, Inc.
Other circuits103 have addressed and analyzed the ATS’ jurisdiction
over a corporate defendant, including the Eleventh Circuit. In Romero v.
Drummond Company, Inc., members of a Colombian trade union and
relatives of deceased union leaders alleged that the president of Drummond,
Ltd., a Colombian subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, had paid paramilitary
agents to assassinate union leaders.104 Claims were brought against the

94. Id.
95. Conspiracy liability involves “[a]n agreement by two or more persons to commit an
unlawful act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (9th ed. 2009).
96. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 247.
97. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. See supra note 78.
99. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 259. The court addressed aiding and abetting liability
because the claims were associated predominantly with criminal charges rather than civil
proceedings. Id. at 257 n.7.
100. Id. at 260.
101. Id. at 261 n.12 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
Interestingly, in the district court, defendants had moved for a judgment on the pleadings. They
argued that the decisions in Sosa and Flores required that the court reconsider: (1) whether
“corporations can be liable for violating the ATS;” and (2) whether “accessorial liability” falls
within the ATS. Id. at 251. The district court denied the motion. Id.
102. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
103. “The split in opinions rendered by the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is illustrative of
the struggle between finding a jurisdictional basis for such suits and taking into account the
potential impact on foreign relations.” Willett et al., supra note 55.
104. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). Claims were brought
under both the ATS and the Torture Act. Id. The court distinguishes the two statutes, explaining
that ATS is jurisdictional without creating causes of action, while the Torture Act “provides a
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing” without granting jurisdiction. Id. at 1315. As a
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parent company, its subsidiary, and company executives.105 Drummond
argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS to
hear suits against corporations.106 Couching its decision in precedent, the
court held that “[t]he text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for
corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants
jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants.”107
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit had previously permitted claims for
aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.108 Although a jury verdict in
favor of defendant was affirmed, 109 the Eleventh Circuit has, as a result of
its prior holdings, gained a reputation for being “one of the most [ATS]
plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions.”110
4. Central District of California: Doe v. Nestle
Another court has recently explored corporate liability claims in dicta
even after resolving the case on other grounds.111 In Doe v. Nestle,
allegations of forced child labor on cocoa fields in Côte d’Ivoire were
brought against Nestle.112 The district court held that,
corporations . . . may not presently be sued under Sosa and the [ATS].
There is no support in the relevant sources of international law for the
proposition that corporations are legally responsible for international law
violations. International law is silent on this question . . . . [A]ll of the
available international law materials apply only to states or natural
persons.113
result, defects in pleading claims under the ATS are jurisdictional defects and therefore should be
addressed first in order to “reach the merits of the appeal.” Id. at 1314.
105. Id. at 1309.
106. While this note focuses on issues under the ATS, Drummond alleges issues under both the
ATS and the Torture Act. Id. at 1309. He claimed the following subject matter jurisdiction issues:
Drummond first argues that neither the Torture Act nor the Alien Tort Statute allows
suits against corporations. Drummond next argues that these Acts do not provide claims
for aiding and abetting. Finally, Drummond argues that the Torture Act provides the
exclusive cause of action for extrajudicial killing in violation of international law.
Id. at 1314. Similarly, Drummond presents four additional issues relating to partial summary
judgment and issues relating to evidentiary and discovery rulings of the lower court, which will
not be discussed here.
107. Id. at 1315 (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th
Cir.2005)).
108. Id. (citing Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2005)).
109. This court did not examine whether or not international law provided the framework to
approve the proposed cause of action.
110. Memorandum from Baker Botts LLP, Alien Tort Statute Update: Two Recent Appellate
Decisions Affect Alien Tort Statute Cases Against Corporations (Jan. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/AlienTortStatuteJanuary09.htm.
111. Doe v. Nestle, No. CV 05-5133 SVW (JTLx), 2010 WL 3969615, at *57 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
8, 2010).
112. Id. at *1–4.
113. Id. at *74.
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The district court’s analysis in Nestle begins at the typical starting
point, Sosa, and continues by exploring the “well-defined, universallyaccepted international law” requirement.114 Finding that Sosa stands for the
proposition that only international law is the appropriate barometer to
define the scope of liability, the court determined that utilizing domestic
common law would be “imperial[istic].”115 The district court did
acknowledge that courts have taken different approaches when evaluating
the international law standard.116 As a result, the district court stated that the
issue of determining ATS corporate liability “remains open to reasonable
debate.”117
In Nestle, the district court sought to dispose of several arguments that
had been made in previous cases in support of corporate liability under the
ATS. Rather than focusing on what the law should be or why policy should
encourage corporate responsibility, the Nestle court stated that courts
should focus on what the law actually asserts.118 The court argued that while
circuit court decisions—including decisions in Romero v. Drummond and
Khulumani—have accepted corporate ATS liability, little weight should be
given to these precedents because they neglect to identify a universal
standard of international law.119
The district court reasoned that, although three limited areas were
originally found to meet the “law of nations” threshold (violation of safe
114. Id. at *59–60.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *61–62. For examples of different approaches, compare id. (citing Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“the issue
of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] is indistinguishable from the question
of whether private individuals may be.”)), with id. (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th Cir.2005) (finding corporate liability under the ATS, without
even addressing the issue directly)).
For example, In re Agent Orange involved a product liability claim against chemical
companies for the manufacturing of a toxic herbicide used during the Vietnam War. In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
In any event, even if it were not true that international law recognizes corporations as
defendants, they still could be sued under the ATS. . . . [T]he Supreme Court made
clear that an ATS claim is a federal common law claim and it is a bedrock tenet of
American law that corporations can be held liable for their torts.
Id. (citing Brief Amici Curiae of the Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Earthrights Int’l and the Int’l
Human Rights Law Clinic at the Univ. of Va. School of Law at 24–26, In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (No. 04 CV 0400 (JBW))). See also Anthea Roberts, The Agent
Orange Case: Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical, 99 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 380, 385 (2005) (discussing that although Judge Weinstein dismissed the
claims, he “recognized corporate liability under international law and the ATS”).
117. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *62(“[D]espite the weight of domestic authority supporting
that conclusion, this issue remains open to reasonable debate. Notably, the Second Circuit recently
ordered further briefing on this issue, which reveals that the question is not settled in that
Circuit.”).
118. Id. at *63–64 (fairness and logic argument).
119. Id. at *64–65 (domestic court precedent).
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conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy), these
causes of action were historically reserved for individual, not corporate,
liability.120 The Nestle court found that since directors, officers, and
employees act on behalf of corporations, individuals are responsible for
violations and should be held accountable, not the corporate entity.121 The
court argued that this analysis was employed in the Nuremberg Tribunals,
which interpreted the London Charter to hold individual members, rather
than organizations, liable for legal offenses.122 Relying on the London
Charter, the court in Nestle found the Second Circuit’s use of treaties as
evidence in support of corporate liability in Talisman Energy only
marginally authoritative.123 Finding that the United Nations conferences did
not adequately touch on the issue of corporate liability, the district court
determined that there was no international law standard for corporate
liability.124 The court argued that international law should not be changed
simply by asserting a claim or cause of action and seeing if other states
object.125 Instead, the burden fell on plaintiff to demonstrate that
international law did recognize corporate liability.126
III. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
Similar criticisms against a finding of corporate liability in the
international law context were employed by the majority in Kiobel, which
involved claims against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell
Transport and Trading Company PLC, acting through a Nigerian
subsidiary.127 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants aided and abetted the
Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses against Nigerian
citizens.128 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed some claims it deemed were not recognized by
international law,129 but denied defendants’ motion to dismiss claims
relating to “aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against
120. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
29).

121. See Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *67. The Nestle court discussed United States v. Krauch
for the proposition that the term “corporations” was not meant to reference its legal character and
was instead “obiter dictum.” Id. (citation omitted). “In other words, the tribunal’s references to the
company were placeholders meant as shorthand for the individual members of the
company. . . . [and] were not substantive discussions regarding legal responsibility.” Id.
122. Id. at *67–68 (Nuremberg-based precedent).
123. Id. at *66–69 (precedent established by treaties and conventions).
124. See id. at *70–71 (describing the United Nations conferences relating to the Rome Statute
as demonstrating the lack of an established standard which has gained global acceptance).
125. Id. at *72–73 (international practice).
126. Id. at *73 (domestic court reasoning).
127. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 124 (dismissing claims of “aiding and abetting property destruction; forced exile;
extrajudicial killing; and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association”).
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humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.”130
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court certified its entire order for
interlocutory appeal.131 On appeal, the Second Circuit in Kiobel reasoned
that “although customary international law has sometimes extended the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to individuals, it has never
extended the scope of liability to a corporation.”132 As a result, the court
held that the ATS did not grant jurisdiction over civil claims brought
against corporate defendants.
Before Kiobel, the Second Circuit’s approach in determining
jurisdiction under the ATS had been characterized by legal scholars as
expansive.133 However, the court’s holding in Kiobel appears to limit
jurisdiction, finding that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over claims
against corporations, thus exempting them from ATS liability. The court
distinguished its current approach from Khulumani and Talisman Energy
where the court had held open the possibility of corporate ATS liability.
Talisman Energy, interestingly, was heard on the same day and by the same
panel of judges as Kiobel.134
Despite prior case law on the issue, the court in Kiobel contended that
past cases did not analyze the issue of corporate liability.135 Commentators
have not agreed with this position. The court’s decision has been deemed “a
significant departure from established ATS jurisprudence,”136 “unlikely to
settle the question as to whether corporations may be held liable under the
ATS,”137 and described as a decision involving “three complex and
fractured steps.”138 Unlike Talisman Energy, where the issue of corporate
liability was fully briefed for the court, but not analyzed in depth, the
Kiobel court nevertheless took the opportunity to explore corporate
liability.139 The court reasoned that reviewing subject matter jurisdiction de
novo was appropriate, regardless of the Second Circuit’s past approach.140
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 120.
See Kline, supra note 39, at 695.
Michael D. Goldhaber, The Supreme Court Could Kill the Corporate Alien Tort Sooner
Than You Think, THE AM LAW DAILY (Sept. 27, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2010/09/corporatealientort.html [hereinafter Goldhaber, Supreme Court].
135. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
136. Press Release, Harvard Law School, International Human Rights Clinic Files Amicus Brief
in Corporate Alien Tort Statute Case (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/
2010/10/21_ihrc.html.
137. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Second Circuit Holds That Corporations
Cannot Be Held Liable for Claims Brought Under the Alien Tort Statute, CORPORATE &
SECURITIES LAW BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/securitieslitigation-second-circuit-holds-that-corporations-cannot-be-held-liable-for-claims-brought-underthe-alien-tort-statute.html.
138. Goldhaber, Life and Death, supra note 1.
139. Goldhaber, Supreme Court, supra note 134.
140. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
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The standard to employ when reexamining jurisdiction under the ATS
was not defined by the Second Circuit in a unanimous decision. Rather, the
majority and concurring opinions agreed that the complaint should be
dismissed, but on very different grounds. While the majority rejected the
existence of corporate liability under the ATS on international law grounds,
the concurrence argued that the claims for aiding and abetting did not
satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
required under Iqbal.141 In this case, particularly because of the pre-existing
circuit split on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS, both the
majority and concurrence provide valuable commentary.
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority used a two step approach to arrive at the conclusion that
corporate liability does not exist under the ATS. Step one analyzed whether
international or domestic law governs the corporate liability inquiry. Step
two evaluated corporate liability through the lens of international law by
analyzing tribunals, international treaties, and scholarly work.142
The majority contended that the question before the court, provoked by
footnote 20 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, was “whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.”143 In part one—relying on the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Sosa—the Kiobel majority concluded that international law
which is “specific, universal and obligatory”144 governs questions of
liability under the ATS, not domestic law. Based upon its interpretation of
footnote 20, the court reasoned that two questions must be answered to
meet the threshold of international acceptance: “both whether certain
conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the scope of liability under the
ATS extends to the defendant being sued.”145
Part two of the majority’s opinion reviewed sources of international
law. Relying on and adopting the philosophy of Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), sources of international law
include: conventions, customs, and general concepts found in civilized
nations.146

141. Id. at 193 (Leval, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 125 (majority opinion). In this matter, the label concurring opinion tends to be a
misnomer, since on the issue of corporate liability, its point of view is better categorized as a
dissent.
143. Id. at 120 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
144. Id. at 118 n.12 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
145. Id. at 128.
146. Id. at 132.
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1. International Tribunals and Treaties
The majority’s opinion is predominantly an analysis of international
tribunals since the Nuremberg trials. Beginning its discussion, the majority
stated, “[w]e find it particularly significant, therefore, that no international
tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of the law of nations.”147 Relying on the Nuremberg Tribunals and
the London Charter as instructive sources of customary international law
relating to human rights violations,148 the court highlighted that only
individual, natural persons, not organizations or entities, could be liable for
a crime.149 Acknowledging the court’s holding from Filartiga that law
evolves with time, the court continued its analysis of tribunals beyond the
Nuremberg period. As previously cited in Khulumani, the court looked to
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as well as the Rome Statute for guidance. In finding that the
jurisdiction of all such tribunals is limited to “natural persons,”150 the court
concluded that there is no international acceptance of corporate liability.151
Without distinguishing between civil and criminal liability, the majority
held that, “[t]he concept of corporate liability for violations of customary
international law has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance . . . .
[and the] complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”152
Looking to another source of international law, the majority analyzed
international treaties, analogizing treaties to contracts between nations that
could mature into customary international law only if adopted and adhered
to by “an overwhelming majority” of nations.153 Further undermining their
evidentiary value, the majority highlighted that the scope of liability created
under a treaty is limited to the specific subject matter of the treaty.154
Acknowledging that some treaties have imposed liability on corporations,
the court deemed such instances as insufficient due to their limited
occurrence.155

147. Id.
148. Id. at 132–33. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477–78 (2001) (discussing the manner in which international
criminal law during the Nuremberg trials did not foreclose the possibility of corporate liability, but
rather demonstrated a willingness to consider corporate liability).
149. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133.
150. Id. at 136–37 (citing the ICTY, ICTR, and the Rome Statute).
151. Id. at 137.
152. Id. at 149.
153. Id. at 137 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003)).
154. See id. at 138.
155. Id. at 139.
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2. Legal Experts
Next, the majority looked to two law professors’ expert opinions
supporting the notion that corporate liability is not recognized
internationally. The majority asserted that Professor James Crawford stated
that “‘no national court [outside the United States] and no international
judicial tribunal has so far recognized corporate liability, as opposed to
individual liability, in a civil or criminal context on the basis of a violation
of the law of nations or customary international law.’”156 Similarly, the
majority relied on Professor (now Judge) Christopher Greenwood’s
assertion that “‘there is no[], and never has been, any assertion of the
criminal liability of corporations in international law.’”157 Beyond these two
scholars, the majority cited no further academic support. Instead, it argued
that the burden is on plaintiffs to establish that a norm of international law
exists.158
B. JUDGE LEVAL’S CONCURRENCE
Judge Leval’s concurrence strongly rejected the majority’s application
of legal precedent, characterizing the argument as “illogical, internally
inconsistent, contrary to international law, and incompatible with rulings of
both the Supreme Court and [the Second Circuit].”159 While agreeing with
the majority that international law provides the appropriate foundation for
evaluating ATS liability, the concurrence questioned the majority’s failure
to distinguish civil from criminal liability. The concurrence argued that for
issues of civil liability, international law has taken no position and has
instead allowed individual nations to establish their own standards and
remedies.160 It concluded that international law compels one to look to
domestic law when interpreting issues of civil liability. The concurrence
began by discussing the objectives of international law and proceeds by
distinguishing civil and criminal liability, and reevaluating the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sosa to support its interpretation that corporate liability
under the ATS is appropriate.
1. Policy Arguments in Support of Corporate Liability
Judge Leval views international law as a compilation of rules that have
worldwide acceptance, the focus and purpose of which has evolved to
protect against hostis humani generis conduct and heinous violations of

156. Id. at 143 (quoting Declaration of Professor James Crawford ¶ 10, Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-0016) (emphasis added)).
157. Id. at 143 (quoting Second Declaration of Christopher Greenwood ¶ 13, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882 (S.D.N.Y July 10, 2002)).
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id. at 174 (Leval, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 153.
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humanitarian rights.161 His concurrence argued that the majority’s approach
protects corporations against such violations simply because corporations
are incorporated. The concurrence went on to posit that the majority’s
opinion defeats international law’s very objective which is to “protect
fundamental human rights.”162 Applying the majority’s rule to examples of
slave trading, piracy, and genocide, the concurrence demonstrates the
absurd consequences that would result from corporations having unfettered
protection from liability under international law.163
2. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Liability
The concurrence acknowledged that a policy argument that runs counter
to the majority’s approach is insufficient grounds upon which to deem its
reasoning inappropriate. Rather, Judge Leval questioned the majority’s
main evidentiary source—international tribunals. Since the ATS involves
civil liability, Judge Leval questioned the tremendous weight that the
majority gave to international tribunals, which only have jurisdiction over
criminal claims.164 The concurrence underscored that the majority’s
approach assumes that international law equates civil and criminal
liability.165 Judge Leval argued that international law does distinguish
between civil and criminal liability and that while corporate criminality is
not internationally accepted, corporate civil liability does not have the same
fate.166
3. Sosa’s Reference to Norms
The Supreme Court in Sosa defined international law, or law of nations,
as rules that have received universal acceptance.167 The Kiobel concurrence
argued however, that “[t]he majority opinion, disregarding the context of
the Court’s discussion, construes the ‘norm’ under discussion as a
convention concerning the type of violator of international law upon whom
civil tort liability may be imposed.”168 As a result, the concurrence
demonstrated that the majority’s approach inappropriately required that a
norm for imposing tort liability on a corporate violator must be considered
universally accepted.
Judge Leval contended that the tortious conduct must be considered a
violation of a universally accepted norm of international law. While who
perpetrates the crime is not irrelevant, the concurrence argued that the
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 154–55 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155–57.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 170–72.
Id.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 177 (Leval, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court was distinguishing between conduct committed by or on
behalf of the State and crimes committed independently of State action.169
The concurrence interpreted footnote 20 as not distinguishing corporations
and individuals.170 Additionally, universal acceptance of a remedy—in this
case civil damages—need not be an international norm.171 The Supreme
Court was merely distinguishing “between conduct that does, and conduct
that does not, violate the law of nations.”172 Finally, the concurrence
criticized the lack of academic support for the majority’s conclusion and its
failure to cite to any published scholastic work.173
IV. KIOBEL’S CONCURRENCE AS THE APPROPRIATE
APPROACH
Some courts have already adopted the majority’s reasoning from
Kiobel.174 However, the statutory language of the ATS creates an
ambiguous standard that fails to specify the identity of potential defendants
or causes of action, or to differentiate between criminal and civil
violations.175 Matters are further complicated by the ATS’s hybrid nature,
which, according to Michael Koebele, “combines both the public and the
private sphere because it does not only incorporate public international law
by reference but equally forms part of federal torts law.”176 Due to the
court’s reliance in Kiobel on international law as providing the standard for
ATS liability, the focal point of the court’s analysis should have been
dependent on how international law responds to civil liability, specifically.
A. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL LIABILITY?
If international law fails to distinguish between civil and criminal
liability, the majority’s reliance on international tribunals may have firm
footing. However, “[i]nternational law distinguishes clearly between [civil
and criminal liability] and provides differently for the different objectives of
criminal punishment and civil compensatory liability.”177 Accordingly, the
Kiobel concurrence appropriately criticized the majority’s approach since
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 181.
United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 WL 4281892, at *29–30 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29,
2010) (citing Kiobel as providing the appropriate procedure in assessing customary international
law); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., No. 1:06-cv-00627-JMS-TAB, 2010 WL 4174583,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2010) (holding that corporations are not liable under the ATS).
175. See discussion supra Part II.
176. MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US TORTS LAW 195 (2009) (footnote
omitted).
177. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
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international tribunals have only evaluated issues related to criminal, not
civil, liability.
As highlighted by the concurrence, criminal law and civil law have
distinct standards and objectives. While one purpose of criminal liability is
to punish a perpetrator for wrongdoing, civil liability seeks to compensate
victims for a harm caused to them.178 Furthermore, both have different
burdens of proof; criminal law requires that elements of a given crime be
established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” a higher evidentiary standard than
civil law, which requires only that liability be established “by a
preponderance of the evidence”.179
While the majority in Kiobel supports its finding of no corporate
liability in part based on the Nuremberg Trials, other conclusions may be
drawn from the Nuremberg cases.180 The absence of corporate defendants in
these cases does not necessarily equate to a finding of no corporate liability,
particularly because the trials discussed corporations’ responsibilities and
obligations even without a named corporate defendant.181
B. “SPECIFIC, UNIVERSAL, AND OBLIGATORY”182
Although the Kiobel concurrence argued that in order to find a party
liable under the ATS, the requirement of an internationally accepted norm
need only apply to the tortious conduct, the majority suggests that
international law also governs whether a particular defendant can be found
liable for the corresponding tort.183 Regardless of this distinction, the
concurrence’s approach should nevertheless prevail. Defining customary
international law is a challenging prospect and even the majority in Kiobel
acknowledges that numerous sources of case law, treaties, and academic
writing must be consulted when making such a determination.184 If that is
178. Id. at 169.
179. Both the majority and concurrence agree that international criminal law does not have
jurisdiction over corporate defendants; therefore, this note does not discuss corporate criminality
in the international sector in detail.
180. See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 155 n.7 (Leval, J., concurring) (explaining that civil liability
was not imposed on corporate executives in the Nuremberg Trials in order to highlight a flaw in
the majority’s reasoning. Since civil damages were not awarded against the executives,
international law should not, yet nevertheless does, find natural persons civilly liable).
181. See Ratner, supra note 148, at 477.
182. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos,
Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). The structure for analyzing corporate
rights and duties is based upon the framework employed in a United Nations Report. U.N. Special
Representative of the Sec’y Gen., Human Rights Council, Report on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb.
9, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Report].
183. Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights & Labor Orgs. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV) [hereinafter Brief for Human Rights &
Labor].
184. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131.
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the case, then the current trend in international law toward the regulation of
corporations is one the majority should have considered.185
1. Corporate Rights
In a time of vast globalization, foreign investment, and trade,
corporations have been afforded rights as a consequence of their ever
expanding relationship with host governments and countries.186 Although
sometimes viewed as a threat by developing countries due to the difficulty
of monitoring multinational corporations, international law has nevertheless
integrated corporate rights protection in order to ensure future
investment.187
Corporations have been found to have international rights in numerous
areas of law. Corporations can enforce “long-term development contracts
with foreign states,” protect their land rights against expropriation, and
implement international arbitration agreements.188 In addition, U.S.
corporations may now even enjoy freedom of speech protection.189 “If
corporations have rights under international law, by parity of reasoning,
they must have duties as well.”190
2. Corporate Duties
While nations have been inconsistent in establishing regulations on
foreign corporations, evidence suggests international acceptance of
corporate liability.191 In 2005, the Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), John Ruggie, was asked by United
Nations Human Rights Commission to:



identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and
accountability for businesses and human rights;
clarify the implications for businesses of concepts such as
“complicity” and “sphere of influence”;

185. See KOEBELE, supra note 176, at 196.
186. Cristina Baez et al., Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, 8 U. MIAMI INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 183, 217 (1999–2000) (discussing a trend in international law in which
corporations have “both substantive and procedural legal capacity”). See Chris Jochnick & Nina
Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN Framework Meets Texaco in the
Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) (discussing the growth of
international corporations and the role investment treaties have played in the development of
multinational corporations); Ratner, supra note 148, at 447 (describing the manner in which
human rights advocates have shifted their efforts to focus on private businesses).
187. Jochnick & Rabaeus, supra note 186, at 414 (citing Ratner, supra note 148, at 461).
188. Baez et al., supra note 186, at 217–19; Ratner, supra note 148, at 488.
189. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2010, at A1.
190. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004).
191. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 45, 69 (2002).
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develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human
rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational
corporations and other business enterprises[].192

Pursuant to his role as SRSG, Ruggie sought to find evidence of
international corporate legal responsibilities over a nine year period.193 In a
report written in February of 2007, the issue of whether corporate
responsibility for human rights violations exists under international law was
explored.194 While the report does not suggest that a clear and concise body
of law has developed on the issue, its analysis of “soft law”195 and other
international sources suggests a growing trend towards deeming corporate
liability appropriate under international law standards.196
a. Indirect Responsibilities
As the court outlined in Sosa, and the Second Circuit adopted in Kiobel,
in order for a cause of action to be viable under the ATS it must be
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”197 Even the majority in Kiobel
acknowledged, however, that if these requirements are taken to their most
extreme boundaries, individual liability may not even meet the necessary
threshold because “international law has [only] sometimes extended the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to individuals.”198 At what
point does a standard become obligatory and when is there enough
evidentiary support to draw the conclusion that a norm has been
established? The same questions can be asked when defining
universality.199 Still, the Kiobel majority suggested that liability has “never”
been found against corporations.200
Never is a particularly strong term, but is, at the same time, fairly easy
to rebuff. Soft law is informative in determining a nation’s perspective on a
particular area of law without requiring the formality of legally binding
192. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL
COMPACT (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/issues/human_rights/The_UN_
SRSG_and_the_UN_Global_Compact.html.
193. Id.
194. U.N. Report, supra note 182, at 3.
195. “Soft law is ‘soft’ in the sense that it does not by itself create legally binding obligations.”
Id. at 14. “It derives its normative force through recognition of social expectations by states and
other key actors.” Id.
196. Id. at 11–12.
197. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 n.12 (2d. Cir. 2010) (citing Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
198. Id. at 120.
199. “[N]orm” is defined as “[a] model or standard accepted . . . by society or other large
group.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (9th ed. 2009). “Obligatory” is defined as “[l]egally or
morally binding.” Id. at 1181. “Universality” is defined as “[e]quality of applicability.” Id. at
1677.
200. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120.
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mandates.201 The International Labour Organization (ILO), an agency
within the United Nations, is comprised of governments, employers, and
workers whose shared mission is to promote employment rights and
opportunities.202 Under their Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, corporate duties
include: favoring hiring locally, protecting employee health and safety, and
allowing for the organization and collective bargaining of workers.203 By
highlighting that corporations have obligations under the ILO, which are
agreed to by “governments, industry, and labor,” there is “a sense among
those three constituencies that corporations have duties toward their
employees.”204
Guidelines reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) have similarly required that corporations
conduct their operations in a particular manner.205 While finding that
corporations should protect against human rights abuses abroad, the OECD
fails to specify which rights are of particular concern.206 Still, by directly
addressing corporate actors, the guidelines show a “capacity and
willingness of states to implement their international human rights
obligations” through corporations.207
b. Direct Responsibilities
In First National City Bank (FNCB) v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterio De Cuba, the Supreme Court arguably engaged in the concurrence’s
suggested approach in Kiobel.208 A Cuban bank brought suit against an
American bank for an unpaid letter of credit in which the American bank
counterclaimed for the value of their assets that were seized in Cuba.209 The
Supreme Court reasoned that having a corporate form with juridical status
did not protect the Cuban bank against liability even though the
expropriation of the assets was executed by the Cuban government.210 The

201. See Ratner, supra note 148, at 487–88.
202. About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang—
en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2010).
203. U.N. Report, supra note 182, at 14 (listing the ILO as an example of soft law in support of
corporate liability); Ratner, supra note 148, at 486–87 (discussing the mission behind the ILO).
204. Ratner, supra note 148, at 486–87.
205. Id. at 487. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, http://www.oecd.org/
topic/0,3699,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_37439,00.html (stating that although they are only
recommendations, governments have adopted the Guideline’s standards of good practice).
206. Ratner, supra note 148, at 487–88.
207. U.N. Report, supra note 182, at 14–15.
208. Brief for Human Rights & Labor, supra note 183 (citing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983)).
209. First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 613.
210. Id. at 632–33.

2011]

The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection

597

Court looked to international law which directed them to domestic rules,211
ultimately finding the bank liable. Given that the Court performed a similar
analysis to reach a different conclusion—corporate civil liability—as the
Kiobel majority, the latter’s view that corporations have never been found
liable under international law does not hold up.212 While there may be a
presumption that domestic law applies only to the nation which enacted it, a
more flexible approach has been employed by the Supreme Court,
acknowledging that the United States and international courts have
overridden this presumption for the protection of equity and justice.213
Alternatively, there are instances in which liability has been directly
imposed on corporations. In the environmental law context, international
treaties have enabled liability to attach directly to polluters, including
corporations.214 In addition, anti-corruption laws have created duties that are
binding on corporations.215 Through treaties, the European Union has also
“created a vast body of legal obligations which apply directly to corporate
entities.”216 For example, the Treaty of Rome has sought to regulate
behavior and corporate liability.217 Such duties include mandates against
anticompetitive behavior and regulations with which corporations must
comply.218
C. POLICY
Legal arguments against the implementation of corporate ATS liability
have often taken a policy approach. Opponents of corporate liability have
addressed the potential threat that an overbroad interpretation would create
a “flood” of ATS litigation.219 A brief reflection on the history of ATS legal
precedent,220 however, strongly questions the validity of such a concern,
considering the small number of cases that have been brought and have

211. Id. at 621.
212. Id. at 621–22.
To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether the
separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected would permit the state
to violate with impunity the rights of third parties under international law while
effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. We decline to permit such a
result.
Id. (citing for comparison Anderson v. Abott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944)). See also Brief for
Human Rights & Labor, supra note 183.
213. First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 628–29.
214. Ratner, supra note 148, at 479–80.
215. Id. at 482.
216. Id. at 484.
217. See Loïc Lerouge, Moral Harassment in the Workplace: French Law and European
Perspectives, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 109, 145 (2010).
218. Ratner, supra note 148, at 484.
219. Koh, supra note 190, at 263.
220. See discussion supra Part II.
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survived procedural dismissals.221 Along these same lines, concern that an
expansive approach to ATS liability would lead to corporate liability due to
an enterprise’s mere presence in a nation where tortious conduct was taking
place neglects the legal precedent that has required purpose in establishing
aiding and abetting liability.222
The most prominent policy question that flows from the majority’s
decision in Kiobel is whether corporations should really be free from
liability under the ATS merely because they filed the appropriate
documents to incorporate. After all, corporations obtain tremendous profits
as a result of their international presence, particularly in regions where the
cost of business is significantly cheaper. As noted by the concurring
opinion in Kiobel, “[a]ccording to the rule my colleagues have created, one
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental
human rights can successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for
compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the heinous
operation in the corporate form.”223
The true impact of Kiobel is hotly debated. Some commentators have
suggested that ATS litigation will simply switch gears, focusing efforts on
individual directors and officers.224 On the other hand, litigators have
strategically withdrawn lawsuits until the standard for determining ATS
liability is better established.225
CONCLUSION
ATS liability for corporations allows alien plaintiffs to be compensated
in U.S. district courts for serious, tortious misconduct committed abroad.
While the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel does not eliminate the
opportunity for plaintiffs to bring actions against corporate officers,
directors, or employees, corporations have the deep pockets.226 A
determination that corporations are not liable due to the lack of a
universally accepted norm under international law inappropriately
categorizes the structure and mechanism of international corporate law.
Giving nations the independent ability to determine remedies for violations
delineated in international treaties eliminates the ability to find a norm of
221. O’Gara, supra note 15, at 798 (discussing ATS cases that have been dismissed on
procedural grounds).
222. Although a precise standard has not been put in place, there is no indication that mere
presence would suffice.
223. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J.,
concurring).
224. Kerschberg, supra note 69.
225. Cyrus Farivar, Nokia Siemens Lawsuit Dropped by Iranian Plaintiffs, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6240017,00.html.
226. Corporations are in a position to further protect against liability through corporate liability
insurance. See Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1462
(2010).
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corporate liability. Supreme Court review is required in order to establish a
more defined standard. Evidentiary support for corporate liability from
international treaties, conferences, and tribunals strongly suggests that the
ATS is not dead and the Kiobel majority’s reasoning is fundamentally
flawed and, hopefully, short lived.
Janine M. Stanisz
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